Stealthy GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Exploit GitHub and SharePoint for Government C2 Ops in Asia and Africa
Security researchers have identified two previously undocumented backdoors, dubbed GitDoor and GraphDoor, that repurpose widely used cloud services as covert command‑and‑control (C2) channels. The tools appear to be part of an active intrusion campaign aimed at government entities across several Asian and African nations, using Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub to hide malicious traffic within legitimate network flows.
The campaign delivers the backdoors through a multi‑stage infection chain that ultimately installs small payloads capable of receiving commands from remote operators via standard API calls to SharePoint sites and public GitHub repositories. By blending in with normal traffic, the malware evades many traditional network‑based detection mechanisms that rely on recognizing anomalous outbound connections.
Technical analysis shows GitDoor embeds encoded instructions in commit messages and file updates within a compromised or attacker‑controlled GitHub repository. GraphDoor, on the other hand, leverages Microsoft Graph API endpoints associated with SharePoint to retrieve encrypted command payloads stored as seemingly innocuous documents. Both backdoors maintain persistence by periodically checking for updates, allowing operators to issue new directives without needing direct server access.
The use of mainstream collaboration platforms mirrors tactics observed in earlier threat actor campaigns, where services such as cloud storage, social media, and legitimate SaaS APIs have been weaponized to obscure C2 traffic. Those services benefit from widespread trust, encrypted transport, and robust availability, making them attractive for malicious actors seeking to blend in with normal corporate communication.
Targeted governments could face a range of consequences, from data exfiltration and espionage to the manipulation of internal processes. The stealthy nature of the backdoors means that compromised systems may continue normal operations while secretly transmitting information to external actors, complicating incident response efforts.
Experts recommend that organizations review access permissions for cloud services, enforce strict authentication policies, and monitor for unusual API usage patterns. Deploying behavior‑based detection tools that can flag atypical repository activity or abnormal SharePoint document access can help surface hidden C2 traffic. Additionally, regular audits of third‑party service integrations are advised to reduce the attack surface.
Researchers continue to track the evolution of the GitDoor and GraphDoor tools, noting that the underlying methodology could be adapted to other popular platforms. Collaboration between regional CERTs, industry partners, and cloud providers will be crucial to develop shared indicators of compromise and to mitigate the risk of further exploitation across critical government infrastructure.
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